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the Management of the Boreal Forest in Eeyou 
Istchee1*
Abstract
This paper is primarily concerned with the way in which the strategies 
Indigenous peoples choose to address and deal with state power are 
being characterized by recent scholarly assessments of territorial and 
self-government agreements in Canada. The authors contend that 
by emphasizing almost exclusively seemingly irreversible structural 
determinants (such as colonialism and the capitalist logic of dispossession), 
the interpretative orientation of that literature tends to misrepresent the 
nature and dynamics of First Nations politics in the Canadian context 
and minimizes the positive impact of their action on social change. On 
the basis of an examination of contentious politics and the resulting 
institutional practices elaborated in relation to the management of forest 
resources and environmental policy in Eeyou Istchee (land of the James 
Bay Cree) over the past 30 years, the paper underscores instead the 
Cree’s political agency and their ability to secure a substantial measure 
of control over the management of forest resources and the de? nition of 
environmental policy. It argues that the Cree have largely succeeded in 
reversing the historical logic of domination to which Indigenous peoples 
have been submitted and in reappropriating key instruments of collective 
empowerment. The paper ultimately offers a defence for an analytical 
stance that appreciates First Nations’ political and policy choices from 
the perspectives of what they actually mean for the communities involved 
rather than from the point of view of normative and theoretical absolutes. 
Résumé
Cet article pose un regard critique sur la manière par laquelle plusieurs 
travaux qui font actuellement autorité représentent les plus récents 
accords territoriaux et d’autonomie politique engageant l’État canadien 
et les peuples autochtones. Il soutient  que l’insistance de la plupart des 
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auteurs sur des déterminants structurels vraisemblablement irréversibles 
(tels que le colonialisme ou la logique capitaliste de dépossession) pour 
analyser les accords institutionnels auxquels les peuples autochtones sont 
partie prenante débouche sur une orientation interprétative qui dénature 
l’action politique de ces derniers et en minimise les effets positifs sur 
la dynamique de changement social. À partir d’un examen du processus 
politique de reprise de contrôle de la gestion de la forêt boréale par les 
Cris d’Eeyou Istchee (Baie James) au cours des trente dernières années, 
l’article met plutôt l’accent sur l’agentivité de ces derniers et sur leur 
habilité à faire échec à la logique historique de domination à laquelle 
les peuples autochtones au Canada ont été soumis et à se réapproprier 
les principaux instruments de leur émancipation collective. En bout de 
piste, le texte propose un plaidoyer pour une posture analytique qui 
sache aborder les choix politiques des peuples autochtones en ce qu’ils 
représentent pour les communautés qui font ces choix et non pas selon la 
vision normative et théorique de quelque idéal politique.
Introduction
Indigenous peoples-state relations in Canada have mobilized much 
intellectual energy over the past few decades. For good reasons: the 
political goals of Indigenous peoples and the strategies deployed to 
achieve them have, in many ways, considerably shaken Canada’s sense of 
national and political unity, and forced Canadians to reconsider seriously 
their historical and current attitude vis-à-vis the claims of ethnocultural 
minorities. Increased demands for recognition and self-determination 
made by Indigenous peoples in particular, raise ethical, political and legal 
questions that speak directly to the nature of Canada’s democracy and 
the appropriate parameters that should inform the dynamics of relations 
between the largely Eurodescendant, socially hegemonic population and 
racialized and subalternized ethnocultural minority groups. The plight 
of Indigenous peoples has generally elicited many sympathetic and 
varied normative, theoretical and empirical analyses. Most are genuinely 
concerned both to unpack the historically unequal social and political 
relations of Indigenous peoples with the Canadian state and society 
and suggest ways to reverse their logic in line with the most robust 
principles of democracy. A consensus has yet to emerge, however, as to 
how to characterize the nature of their interaction and more speci? cally 
the response of Indigenous peoples to the state actions that affect them 
directly.
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A number of recent accounts, within both the Canadian and 
international scholarly literature, readily argue that Indigenous peoples 
have established themselves as a signi? cant political force with means 
and in? uence suf? cient to lend institutional legitimacy to their own, 
community-based conception of citizenship and bring the state to 
recon? gure its criteria of civic and political inclusion along broader, more 
democratic and more accommodating lines (Papillon, “Fragmentation”); 
they have become credible international actors (Brysk; Duplessis; Fritz 
et al.; Jhappan) capable of moving the international community to their 
side, transforming mindsets, engaging the one-dimensional, totalizing 
logic of the state (Niezen, “Recognizing Indigenism”, The Origins) and 
forcing the rede? nition of—even stopping—development policies and 
projects antithetical to their interests (Blaser, Feit, and McRae; Jenson 
and Papillon).
Parallel to this scholarship emphasizing the political successes of 
Indigenous peoples, a critical literature questioning the depth of their 
gains has also emerged. As we will see in more details below, it generally 
contends that the self-government arrangements that First Nations succeed 
in negotiating for themselves trap them into accepting the institutional and 
constitutional parameters of the Canadian state whose strategy consists 
essentially in consolidating its colonial (and racist) sway over Indigenous 
peoples: in this context, attempts to exercise or implement any form of 
self-determination remain illusory.
While there is evidence to suggest that the actual political clout of 
Indigenous peoples is relative and ultimately quite fragile, and that the 
state does indeed work to curtail the full expression of First Nations 
self-determination (Corntassel; Salée, Field, and Horn-Miller), the 
ability of Indigenous peoples to advance their cause and navigate 
ef? ciently and creatively past the state’s roadblocks on the path to 
political autonomy is not inconsequential. Admittedly, the structures and 
patterns of domination that have historically put Indigenous peoples at 
great disadvantage, politically, culturally and economically, are all too 
real and still continue to operate. But the sheer political tenacity of First 
Nations communities and Indigenous leaders is also real. Many struggle 
successfully to make the best of adverse conditions and bring the state 
to amend its initial, strong-arm stance. Their persistence is not any less 
signi? cant, even when in the end its impact on the power of the state may 
prove to be limited. Between the exultant reports of Indigenous peoples’ 
political accomplishments and the disappointment of those for whom 
anything less than complete and unequivocal self-determination is a sign 
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of abandon to the dictates of the colonial state, there is a grey zone of 
everyday politics that needs to be better understood. It is mainly within 
that grey zone, where theoretical and abstract normative absolutes often 
have less resonance, that Aboriginal politics takes place and the contents 
of Indigenous responses (and resistance) to the state take shape. 
This paper is primarily concerned with the way in which the strategies 
Indigenous peoples choose to address and deal with state power are being 
characterized by recent scholarly assessments of territorial and self-
government agreements in Canada. We contend that the interpretative 
orientation of that literature tends to misrepresent the nature and 
dynamics of First Nations politics in the Canadian context and minimizes 
in the process the positive impact of their action on social change. As 
such, the paper suggests a different analytical route that emphasizes 
the reversal of the historical logic of domination to which Indigenous 
peoples have been submitted, toward the reappropriation and control of 
key instruments of collective empowerment. The paper proceeds on the 
basis of an examination of contentious politics and resulting institutional 
practices elaborated in relation to the management of forest resources 
and environmental policy in the James Bay area over the past 30 years 
of interaction between Eeyou Eenou (the Cree Nation) and the Quebec 
government over territorial control and Cree political and administrative 
autonomy2. The ? rst section offers a critical review of an increasingly 
authoritative body of scholarly literature that tends to emphasize the 
continued action of the Canadian state’s unchanging colonialist mentality 
and minimize the extent of the gains purportedly made in recent self-
government and land claims agreements to which various First Nations 
communities have agreed. The second section focuses on the process by 
which the James Bay Cree have secured, over time, a substantial measure 
of control over the management of forest resources and the de? nition 
of environmental policy in the area. The third section evaluates their 
achievements in light of the constraints borne out of the politicization of 
the boreal forest in Quebec. The paper concludes with a general re? ection 
on the analytical status of the political agency of Indigenous peoples in 
Canada.
Reading Self-Government Agreements and First Nations Claims 
of Self-Determination
In a recent essay, political scientist Gabrielle A. Slowey argues that Cree 
leaders are basically deluding themselves and their constituents when 
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they claim that the 2002 Paix des Braves, the latest agreement they signed 
with the Quebec state3, is based on the recognition of a nation-to-nation 
relationship and the notion that First Nations constitute one of three orders 
of government. She writes:
[E]ven though the rhetoric of the agreement suggests partnership, 
the fact remains that [this is not an agreement] made among 
governments as equals. [It is] strictly about establishing economic 
relationships, based on mutual interest, and stabilizing state-First 
Nations relations. Even though bringing First Nations governments 
to the table with other levels of government to establish these 
economic arrangements may represent an important step forward 
for First Nations in the region by providing them a voice, they do 
not translate into a renewed relationship between the state and First 
Nations. (…). The bene? t of the agreement for [the Cree] is limited to 
the recognition that their governments and their representatives must 
be consulted. Meaningful participation at the highest levels, along 
with recognition of, and accommodation for, First Nations autonomy 
within existing parameters of Canadian federalism, remains elusive. 
Instead of setting a place for First Nations government at the federal 
table, structural and systemic barriers perpetuate the exclusion of 
First Nations and their governments. (“Federalism” 166-167)
Slowey’s stance is emblematic of a number of like-minded efforts at 
deconstructing the political subtext of territorial and self-government 
agreements between First Nations and the state in Canada. Most of the 
analyses of this question produced in recent years point with minor 
variations to the same unequivocal conclusion: in its dealings with 
Indigenous peoples the state imposes a logic of interaction that is not 
about reconciliation or mending the past, but is driven primarily by a 
will both to contain First Nations’ claims for political autonomy within 
the de? ning principles and socio-institutional boundaries of Canadian 
political structures and processes, and con? ne their aspirations for 
economic empowerment to the strict imperatives of the global capitalist 
market and to the dictates and interests of  the Canadian  corporate elite 
(Alfred, “Deconstructing”; Altamirano-Jimenez; Borrows; Day and 
Sadik; Denis; Green and Peach; Irlbacher-Fox; Rynard, “Welcome In”, 
“Ally or Colonizer?”; Slowey, “Globalization”). For several authors, 
the case is clear: despite its rhetoric of openness and sympathy to the 
plight of Indigenous peoples, the Canadian state remains committed to 
a policy of dispossession (Gordon; Simmons; Slowey, “Aboriginal Self-
Government”) and is fundamentally unwilling to let go of its colonialist 
mindset (Green; Ladner and Orsini; Samson).
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Some take the argument further and contend that the choices First 
Nations communities have to make about their future and modes of 
government are therefore severely limited by the hegemonic cultural 
framework of Canadian society and by the institutional environment 
in which the Canadian state forces them to operate. This environment 
is by no means neutral: the claims made by First Nations within it and 
whatever degree of recognition they may succeed in getting from the state 
in the end remain conditioned by discursive and institutional settings that 
are “profoundly hierarchical and incredibly power-laden, and as such 
have the ability to asymmetrically mold and govern how Indigenous 
subjects think and act” (Coulthard 452). Through no fault of their own, 
Indigenous peoples are so immersed in the White-settlers’ worldview 
and institutional subjectivities that their own demands for recognition 
and claims for political autonomy cannot transcend these subjectivities: 
they are forced to formulate their aspirations in terms that are not theirs, 
toward goals that do not correspond to their best interests. As Taiaiake 
Alfred and Jeff Corntassel explain:
Colonial legacies and contemporary practices of disconnection, de-
pendency and dispossession have effectively con? ned Indigenous 
identities to state-sanctioned legal and political de? nitional ap-
proaches. This political-legal compartmentalization of community 
values often leads Indigenous nations to mimic the practices of 
dominant non-Indigenous legal-political institutions and adhere to 
state-sanctioned de? nitions of Indigenous identity. Such compart-
mentalization results in a ‘politics of distraction’ that diverts ener-
gies away from decolonizing and regenerating communities and 
frames community relationships in state-centric terms […] (600)4
The implication is clear: Indigenous peoples will never be really free and 
in full control of their destiny so long as they continue to operate within 
the current political and institutional framework and accept its normative 
premises. 
Given the particular history of interaction between Indigenous peoples 
and the state in Canada and the often alarming socio-economic conditions 
still experienced by too many First Nations communities, the hard-hitting 
tone of this literature is hardly surprising. In their extensive and balanced 
review of the intellectual production on Aboriginal self-government in 
Canada since the 1960s, David Newhouse and Yale Belanger could not 
help but conclude that the Canadian state has for all intents and purposes 
appropriated the notion of self-government and constructed it in a way 
“that offers little ? exibility for the inclusion of culturally-speci? c ideas of 
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governance into the creation of Aboriginal self-government” (39); indeed, 
“self-government in Canada is a misnomer for it is the government who 
controls the agenda and provides space for future Aboriginal governments 
to ? t neatly into all without allowing the signi? cant transfer of decision 
making to the First Nations” (41)5.
The critical perspective that informs a good deal of the most recent 
literature on self-government and issues of recognition is largely meant 
to bring to light the dynamics of unequal power relations that still shape 
in various, subtle ways the rapport between settler society and Indigenous 
peoples. In this sense, it is formulated in response to the celebratory, 
self-satis? ed, but vastly misleading governmental vision of an open, 
pluralist, multicultural and generous Canada. It follows in that a well-
established tradition of social criticism rooted in left political economy 
and more recently in postcolonial, subaltern and race studies as well as 
in deconstructionist critiques of modernity. It is also meant, on a more 
political level, to encourage Indigenous peoples to engage in a different 
kind of emancipatory politics, outside the realm of dominant, mainstream 
institutions—a politics aimed at reconnecting with the heritage, values, 
languages and ways of knowing of their ancestors6. For all its merits, 
though, its insistence on describing the relations of Indigenous peoples 
with settler society as locked in an un? inching, colonial and imperial 
dynamic that always plays to the sole advantage of Euro-Canadians and 
the state they have imposed, raises analytical issues with respect to the 
accuracy with which state-Indigenous peoples relations and the strategic 
choices of First Nations communities are represented and understood.
In its current intellectual orientation, much of the latest critical 
scholarship on Aboriginal self-government implicitly downplays the very 
real efforts and successes of Indigenous peoples in transforming unequal 
relations of power in ways that clearly improve their objective situation. 
It may well appear that on the surface of things, from the point of view 
of theoretical and normative absolutes, Indigenous peoples invariably 
lose ground in their dealings with the state, even when they conclude 
arrangements that satisfy them: more often than not, they seem compelled 
to abide by political institutions and rules foreign to their tradition of 
governance; constrained to accept development projects and economic 
imperatives that they have not necessarily chosen; and limited in their 
enjoyment of their ancestral territory, as if control over their own destiny 
ineluctably escaped them. Reality, though, can be quite different. In 
the case of the James Bay Cree, for example, anthropologists and 
ethnographers with intimate knowledge of that society remind us that 
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self-determination was never an objective pursued by the Cree, at least 
not in the way in which political theory generally associates the notion 
with full political autonomy and the attainment of sovereignty. Cultural 
anthropologist Ronald Niezen explains that “the principal goal of Cree 
sovereignty is a fair, equitable, carefully negotiated and honored inclusion 
in an already existing state—Canada—rather than an independent nation” 
(Defending 8). Similarly, with respect to the way the Cree handled the 
imposition of external modes of governance, he maintains that
[...] the development of Cree administrations based on southern 
models does not in itself mean that their values, goals and strategies 
will be the same as those of parent organizations in non-native 
societies. Although the goal of regional autonomy, as seen from the 
view of government negotiators, was a closer integration of the Cree 
in the Quebec administrative system, from the Cree point of view it 
also provided opportunities for reinvigorating attachments to forest 
life. (Defending 5)
In fact, the latest anthropological and ethnographic evidence provides 
several case studies of First Nations communities regaining control of 
their societal and development priorities and achieving in the process a 
greater measure of autonomy from the state (Adelson; James; Kulchyski; 
Warry; Wuttunee). Such evidence calls for a more circumspect reading 
of state-Indigenous peoples relations in Canada, and in particular of the 
strategies Indigenous peoples devise and use in their attempts to make 
their unavoidable interface with the state as productive and as bene? cial 
as possible for themselves. Because certain First Nations opt to work 
within the dominant political and administrative institutions does not 
make that choice less valid. One cannot automatically assume that they 
are necessarily co-opted by the state, forced against their best interest into 
that choice or that they are stripped of any political clout they might have 
had otherwise. 
Through the past 30 years of Indigenous political mobilization, activism 
and struggles, many First Nations have demonstrated a considerable 
degree of political agency and a de? nite ability to rede? ne the terms of 
engagement with the state and settler society. In this sense, the critical 
scholarship on Indigenous self-government is somewhat misguided in its 
appreciation of the dynamic of power-resistance that characterizes social 
interactions. Michel Foucault’s work has convincingly shown that power 
is never unilateral (Pickett); that it cannot be boiled down to a simple 
oppositional binary whereby the oppressor always triumphs over the 
oppressed, the master over the slave, or the conqueror over the colonized. 
Issue 41.indb   106 5/12/2010   1:40:30 PM
Representing Aboriginal Self-Government and First Nations/State Relations
107
The exercise of power always implies manifestations of resistance 
to domination and authority, to social and economic orders that are 
disadvantageous to one’s own well-being and to cultures that negate one’s 
own identity. And in that process of resistance, it is not uncommon for 
the oppressed, the colonized to use the oppressor’s, the conqueror’s tools 
to bolster their own cultures, improve their objective situation and make 
signi? cant political progress, forcing the oppressor and the conqueror to 
recognize their reality and be more sensitive to their claims (Ashcroft). 
The acceptance and use of the dominant culture and institutions are 
not necessarily a proof of capitulation on the part of the oppressed and 
colonized, but can in fact be seen as a sign that they are reinventing 
themselves, adapting their fundamental cultural referents to changing 
circumstances and developing new ones in the process, in tune with their 
evolving priorities. The apparent disregard of the critical scholarship on 
Indigenous self-government for this dimension stems largely from its 
disproportionate analytical emphasis on the philosophical possibilities 
of self-government and the state’s actions and policy narratives rather 
than on what Indigenous peoples actually do to counteract the hegemonic 
position of settler society and culture (Newhouse and Belanger). Without 
a better, more accurate appreciation of this reality, one runs the risk of 
misunderstanding First Nations’ political and policy choices. 
Regaining Ground: The James Bay Cree and the Management of 
the Boreal Forest
The extinguishment of land ownership rights, the imposition by the state 
of administrative limitations to the full enjoyment of ancestral territories 
and fairly exacting governmental parameters restricting the extent of 
Indigenous governance over land, natural resources and environmental 
management issues are usually the main questions upon which critics 
focus to justify their negative assessment of self-government and 
territorial agreements.
On the face of it, they do seem to have a point. In the case of the 
James Bay Cree, the 1975 James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement 
(JBNQA) created a new land regime which lends the Cree control of 
about 1.5 percent of their ancestral land (designated in the Agreement 
as “Category I” lands). On that diminutive portion of their ancestral 
territory, the Cree have exclusive ? sh and wildlife harvesting rights and 
their band councils can pass by-laws and control development (with the 
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exception of subsurface resources such as minerals, oil and gas). Cree 
communities can also log these lands commercially for their own bene? t 
without having to pay duties to the Quebec government, though they 
must conform to governmental logging norms. On about 18 percent of 
the territory (“Category II” lands), the Cree have exclusive rights to hunt, 
trap and ? sh with the assurance that non-Cree competition for game will 
be prohibited and that logging companies will ensure that their activities 
do not disturb the exercise of Cree wildlife harvesting rights. The Cree 
can log those lands commercially, but must pay duties to the government 
and abide by its regulations. The government also reserves the right to 
initiate development project, subject to compensation. Finally, more 
than 80 percent of the Cree ancestral territory remain as public land 
(“Category III” lands), owned by the Quebec state, where the Cree do 
retain wildlife harvesting rights (which are exclusive on some species of 
animals), but are in essence submitted for all other activities to the same 
governmental laws and regulations as any Quebecer, with no particular 
prerogative. Although the Cree willingly agreed to this unequal structure 
of land rights and were initially pleased with the JBNQA7, one can see 
why analysts have concluded that they “have lost ownership rights to 
most of the natural resources of their lands and have had their in? uence 
over development activities con? ned to advisory committees” (Rynard, 
“Welcome In” 223). 
Still, what makes the case of the James Bay Cree interesting is that 
they have regained over the three decades following the signing of the 
JBNQA an appreciable measure of control over the management of their 
land and the direction of environmental and development priorities in 
the region. The Agreement Concerning a New Relationship between le 
gouvernement du Québec and the Crees of Québec (“Paix des Braves”) 
signed on February 7, 2002, con? rmed and substantially upgraded Cree 
in? uence on their territory. The Agreement is founded on the following 
de? ning postulates: it is designed as “a global approach in favour of 
greater autonomy and greater responsibility on the part of the Crees 
for their development” so as “to make possible an active and ongoing 
participation by the Crees in economic development activities on the 
James Bay Territory”; it “is based on a development model which relies 
on the principles of sustainable development, partnership and respect for 
the traditional way of life of the Crees, as well as on a long-term economic 
development strategy” (p. 1); it is meant to “[promote] the emergence 
of a Cree expertise in the ? eld of economic development, job creation, 
and economic spin-offs for the Crees and the population of Quebec in 
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general”; all with the understanding that this is to be accomplished in the 
context of a “nation-to-nation” relation with Quebec8.
With respect to forest management, the new Agreement stipulates 
that Quebec’s forestry regime set out in the Forest Act of 2001 applies 
in the Cree territory, but in a manner that allows “a) adaptation to better 
take into account the Cree traditional way of life; b) greater integration 
of concerns relating to sustainable development; c) participation, in 
the form of consultation, by the James Bay Crees in the various forest 
activities operations planning and management processes.” In essence, 
this means that the Quebec forestry regime will be tailored to suit Cree 
needs and environmental and cultural priorities. Annual allowable cuts 
and General Forest Management Plans cannot be agreed upon or decided 
without the prior consent of the host community and the Cree hunters 
likely to be affected by logging activities; and without taking into account 
key historical and ecological factors as well as factors related to the 
forest structures (in order to improve the distribution of age categories). 
Similarly, no forest management activities can be undertaken on sites 
of special interest to the Cree without their permission. These include 
traditional, cultural and sacred sites, burial sites, seasonal and permanent 
camps, fruit picking areas, archeological sites and sites with archeological 
potential, portage trails, bear dens, waterfowl blinds, supply sources of 
drinking water and any other sites of special value to the Cree. 
The Agreement also sets up two supervisory institutional mechanisms 
in which the Cree are full and equal participants: the Cree-Quebec Forestry 
Board (CQFB) and Joint Working Groups (JWG). The CQFB is composed 
of ? ve Cree representatives appointed by the Cree Regional Authority and 
? ve members chosen by the Quebec government. It operates at the level 
of the whole region to monitor, analyze and assess the implementation 
of the forestry provisions included in the Agreement. Joint Working 
Groups are established in each Cree community to discuss technical 
issues, review and solve con? icting uses of forest resources, ensure the 
implementation of the processes relating to the preparation, consultation 
and monitoring of the forest management plans and exchange information 
on any forestry-related matters9. Finally, the Agreement makes available 
to Cree enterprises an annual volume of 350,000 cubic meters of timber 
(in addition to forestry activities already in operation on Category I lands) 
and commits the government to facilitate Cree employment in the forest 
industry.
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Although the Paix des Braves does not modify the ownership regime 
and the JBNQA extinguishment of Cree territorial rights, it enables the 
Cree to assume a central and determining role in the decision-making 
process regarding land management issues, not simply as watchdogs of 
the economic use of natural resources, but more importantly, in a way that 
allows them to ensure that their particular philosophy of land use—the 
socio-cultural meaning they attach to the land—will be given prominence. 
The passage to this more enviable situation from a state of affairs in 
which, despite the theoretical existence of co-management mechanisms 
extant in the JBNQA, the Cree were, more often than not, overruled, 
marginalized or reduced to unimportant functions (Feit and Beaulieu; 
Penn; Rodon 177-204; Scott and Webber) illustrates the remarkable ascent 
of the Cree on the scale of First Nations involvement in forest management 
conceived by forestry specialist Stephen Wyatt. Wyatt distinguishes ? ve 
degrees of First Nations involvement in forest management: 1. Forestry 
excluding First Nations, which long characterized the standard stance of 
Canadian governments and the forest industry until the 1970s, but is no 
longer in force. 2. Forestry by First Nations, whereby members of First 
Nations or First Nations communities may draw economic bene? ts from 
forestry contracts or milling operations, but would have little opportunities 
to modify existing forest practices to re? ect their own values or goals or to 
see forest management adopt their traditional institutions. 3. Forestry for 
First Nations represents the forest management system most often in force 
in Canada at the moment: existing government regulations and tenure 
arrangements continue to prevail, but with enough ? exibility to encourage 
First Nations’ participation and take into account their knowledge of 
the land through consultation processes. 4. Forestry with First Nations 
implies a signi? cant modi? cation of existing forestry regime, which 
while staying within existing regulatory frameworks, allows for forest 
management to be shared with First Nations, recognizing both their rights 
and the value of their traditional knowledge of the land on a equal footing 
with western science. 5. Aboriginal forestry ? nally represents a forest 
management system in which the interests of First Nations are dominant 
and whereby they are able to de? ne the practices and institutions they 
wish to develop and permit on their land (177-178). 
The JBNQA had the theoretical possibility for the third degree of 
involvement (forestry for First Nations), but as we will see below, it was 
closer in actual terms to the second degree (forestry by First Nations). The 
Paix des Braves does not quite allow for the highest degree, a full system 
of Aboriginal forestry, to exist (the regulatory framework of the state is 
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still in place), but it comes close. Judged on the basis of Wyatt’s scale, the 
Paix des Braves meets the standards of the fourth degree of First Nations 
control over forest management (forestry with First Nations) and exceeds 
current national practices. What happened in the three decades between 
the decision of the Quebec government to dispose of the Cree territory as 
it saw ? t without prior consultation with them and the Paix des Braves 
constitutes a rupture in the socio-historical pattern of land appropriation 
by settler society, a reversal of the traditional dynamics of power in the 
management of the boreal forest, which is essentially attributable to the 
political resolve and agency of the Cree.
Soon after the rati? cation of the JBNQA, it became plain enough that 
the Quebec government saw the Agreement as a way to consolidate its 
jurisdiction over its northern frontier and open it to economic development 
(Peters qtd. in Lathoud, “Les enjeux” 157). The diminishing availability 
of quality timber from southern forests prompted the government to 
facilitate the northward expansion of the forest industry with a number 
of measures10 that led to a rapid increase in portions of the Cree territory 
being harvested (mostly clear cut) for the bene? t of forest companies. 
In the early years of the JBNQA, 125 square kilometers of forest land 
were harvested annually; by 1989, it was up to 400 square kilometers and 
reached 500 square kilometers per year by 2000. In 1993, several hunting 
territories (traplines) had been depleted of between 40 and 80 percent 
of their forest cover. By the end of the 1990s, more than 5000 square 
kilometers of Cree forest (roughly 10 percent of the forested portion of 
the Cree territory) had been logged intensively. Except for one Cree forest 
company (Mishtuk Corporation), all the bene? ciaries of the government’s 
largesse with Cree land were non-Indigenous companies. Parallel to this 
situation, the greater ease of access to the territory (thanks to new logging 
roads and roads leading to the construction sites of hydroelectric projects) 
intensi? ed sport hunting and ? shing by non-Cree, adding to the pressures 
on the resources of the land.
In the end, all this new, basically non-Cree activity was profoundly 
disruptive of the region’s ecosystem, indeed to an extent the Cree 
themselves had surely not anticipated. Animal habitats were destroyed, 
vegetation disappeared in several areas, soil degradation was considerable 
in many places, natural irrigation patterns were upset, spawning areas 
spoiled, beaver dams ruined, and game moved away. As a result, not only 
have Cree hunters had to change their habits and practices as customary 
environmental referents vanished and ancestral knowledge of the land 
became inapplicable, but many of the patterns of social interaction and 
Issue 41.indb   111 5/12/2010   1:40:31 PM
International Journal of Canadian Studies
Revue internationale d’études canadiennes
112
cultural values traditionally associated with the Cree way of hunting, 
? shing and harvesting the land faced signi? cant stress or became obsolete 
(Lathoud, “Les enjeux” 157-160; Lévesque and Montpetit). 
One might argue, from a purely technical standpoint, that these 
consequences, as unpleasant as they appear, were in fact part and parcel 
of the deal the Cree willingly agreed to in 1975; or, again, that they were 
well counterbalanced by an overall improvement in their quality of life11. 
In fact, the Cree were more prepared to accept the changes brought about 
by the JBNQA than most people generally assume. Ethnographic evidence 
shows that the alteration of the traditional Cree way of life did not entail the 
disappearance of Cree culture or assimilation. On the contrary, Cree culture 
has been extremely resilient. It succeeded in adapting the external socio-
cultural elements of the JBNQA universe to its own ends and remained 
vibrant in all the communities of the region (Adelson; James; Lévesque 
and Montpetit; Niezen, Defending). What the Cree were not prepared to 
accept were governmental interpretations of JBNQA provisions on forest 
management that differed fundamentally from theirs and threatened to 
impact negatively on the ecological quality of their land. They were not 
prepared either to obliterate their own conception of the land to bene? t 
other visions. Their struggle to counteract governmental understanding of 
forest management issues framed by the JBNQA followed three distinct 
courses of action, which bear examining.
Playing by the Rules of the JBNQA and the State
Although from the early days of the JBNQA on the Cree’s relationship 
with the Quebec state was never smooth and erupted numerous times in 
very public display of animosity (Jenson and Papillon; Papillon, Action 
collective), they essentially opted to work out differences with respect to 
forest policy within the bounds of the Agreement through the 1980s and 
the better part of the 1990s. In principle, the JBNQA included provisions 
for environmental protection and institutional mechanisms to ensure 
their application. Any forest management plan put forward by forest 
companies on the James Bay territory had to be vetted by the Consultative 
Committee on the Environment in James Bay (CCEJB) before ministerial 
approval. Similarly, any development plan related to logging, including 
roads, pulp and paper plants, wood processing and manufacturing or 
any change in land utilization affecting more than 65 square kilometers, 
had to be submitted to social and environmental impact assessment. The 
CCEJB’s membership was composed in equal measure of representatives 
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from the Cree Regional Authority, the Quebec government and the federal 
government (four each) and chaired by the Chair of the Joint Committee 
on hunting, ? shing and trapping. As a consultative body, the CCEJB’s 
recommendations were not binding, but the Minister responsible for 
forests (usually the Minister of Natural Resources) was expected to pay 
serious heed to them. In reality, the CCEJB often lacked the appropriate 
? nancial and human resources to make proper assessments, development 
projects managed to escape CCEJB’s scrutiny, Ministers failed to follow 
suit on CCEJB’s requests for more information or went ahead, against 
CCEJB’s opinion, with forest management plans that did not meet 
the JBNQA’s guidelines for environmental and social protection. The 
Ministry generally maintained that commercial forestry operations were 
not subject to the impact assessment process outlined in the JBNQA.
By most accounts, forest management under the JBNQA proved to 
be most frustrating for the Cree. Their interpretation of environmental 
protection as formulated in the Agreement regularly differed from that 
of the government and their views were routinely bypassed or dismissed. 
None of their suggestions and recommendations actually saw their 
way into the new Forest Act of 1986. The Cree had insisted that public 
consultation mechanisms be created to ensure wider participation of 
their communities into the decision-making process regarding forest 
management. Instead, the new legislation made forest companies directly 
responsible for presenting their forest management plans (rather than 
the Minister as was the case before). And although a series of legislative 
amendments were added to the law between 1986 and 1996 in order 
to enhance the public consultation dimension of it, the mechanisms 
put in place proved inadequate: the Cree were considered on the same 
footing as any other stakeholder, the lead time allowed to react to forest 
management plans was insuf? cient and no clear and systematic rules of 
procedures were spelled out. In the end, the power balance was loaded 
in favour of forest companies who ultimately decided on the parameters 
for the implementation of consultation processes. They typically limited 
themselves to negotiating ? nancial compensation and contractual 
agreements with tallymen (heads of hunting families) and communities 
affected by logging operations, escaping in the process more in-depth 
scrutiny and the obligation to abide by strict environmental norms. In their 
view, those contracts were proof enough that the concerned population 
was suf? ciently informed and had consented to their logging plans.
Overall, under the JBNQA regime until the Paix des Braves, efforts to 
create the appearance of effective Cree participation in forest management 
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remained unconvincing. As Feit and Beaulieu put it: “the need for Cree 
involvement has been denied and subverted by statements and actions of 
senior government representatives.” Participatory initiatives put forward 
by either the state or corporations were in fact “more concerned with 
legitimating (…) existing decisions (…) than with creating effective 
participation for Cree or with changing environmental and social impacts 
on the ground” (143). 
Judicial Activism
By the early 1990s the Cree began to resort to the courts with increased 
frequency to press their case particularly against Quebec’s new projects 
of hydroelectric development and what they saw as abuses of the terms 
and conditions of the JBNQA. Clearly, playing by the rules did nothing 
to secure their rightful socio-cultural paramountcy on the land as their 
experience in forest policy making attested. Legal action, on the other 
hand, and attacks in international fora on the public image of the Quebec 
and Canadian governments paid tangible political dividends: in 1994, 
despite important ? nancial commitments made to undertake the Great 
Whale project, the Quebec government bowed down to Cree pressures 
and shelved its substantial hydroelectric development plan in the northern 
part of James Bay inde? nitely. The tactic worked and was extended to the 
forest dossier.
On July 15, 1998, the Grand Council of the Crees along with a 
number of individuals (tallymen and chiefs) ? led a law suit in Quebec 
Superior Court against the federal and Quebec governments and 27 forest 
companies involved in harvesting timber on Cree land since 1975. The 
Cree argued that existing forestry practices did not abide by Quebec laws 
and the JBNQA; that they had been authorized without their consent 
and without proper impact assessments; and that logging operations 
hampered their traditional hunting, ? shing and trapping activities. 
They blamed the governments for having failed to stand up to their 
engagements and properly protect the Cree way of life as promised in 
the JBNQA. In compensation, they demanded that their Aboriginal rights 
and those contained in the JBNQA be fully recognized; that governments 
take the necessary actions to ensure that forestry practices be compatible 
with the preservation of their traditional activities; and that all forestry 
operations on their territory be, without exception, submitted to social and 
environmental impact assessments. In addition, they claimed 200 million 
dollars from both Quebec and the federal government, 300 million dollars 
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from all the other defendants and 200 dollars per tree felled since the day 
of the signing of the JBNQA on November 11, 1975.
A year later, on July 6, 1999, as the case was still pending, the Cree ? led 
a request for an interlocutory injunction to forbid the Minister of Natural 
Resources from approving forest management plans and renewing the 
timber supply and forest management agreements (operation contracts) of 
forest companies active on the James Bay territory. Three weeks later they 
? led a second request for an injunction to interrupt all forestry activities 
that did not meet with the approval of the Cree until a ruling on the main 
case was rendered. Finally, seeing that a decision would probably not be 
forthcoming on their request for an injunction before the fall of 2000, 
several months past the deadline for the renewal of timber supply and 
forest management agreements, they ? led for an interim judgment. On 
December 20, 1999, Superior Court Judge Jean-Jacques Croteau ruled 
that the rights of the Cree had been openly and continuously violated by 
Quebec’s forestry regime, adding that the logging system was illegal and 
non-constitutional, for it evaded the impact assessment process enshrined 
in the JBNQA and Quebec’s own Quality of the Environment Act. Judge 
Croteau gave the government six months to modify its laws and enact an 
impact assessment process conforming to the provisions of the JBNQA; 
failure to do so would bring an end to logging activities on July 1, 2000. 
Unsurprisingly, the Quebec government and logging companies appealed 
the decision. It was overturned on May 15, 2000 by the Quebec Court of 
Appeals. The Court ruled that Judge Croteau had prematurely decided on 
the substance of the case, rather than focusing on the injunction as he was 
requested, and prohibited him from hearing the main case as his partiality 
was arguably in question. The Cree responded with outrage and hinted 
that the government exercised undue in? uence on the province’s upper 
Court.
Although the Cree did not quite obtain satisfaction, they got the 
government’s attention. After nearly 18 months of judicial tug of war, 
the government called a high-level meeting on November 23, 2000, 
which brought together, the Grand Council of the Crees, the Premier, the 
Minister of Natural Resources and the Minister of Aboriginal Affairs, to 
settle the Cree suit out of court. The Cree suggested in turn the creation 
of a bipartite structure, with equal representation from their side and 
the government, responsible for enforcing the forestry regime of the 
JBNQA. This structure would be established through a complementary 
agreement, which would be tantamount to a constitutional treaty. The 
government refused and reiterated its prerogatives as sole manager 
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of public land in Quebec. Still, a few weeks later, it came back with a 
proposal that essentially promised to facilitate a better application of the 
forestry provisions of the JBNQA, create a fund to assist Cree hunters and 
trappers ? nancially and harmonize logging activities with their practices, 
and increase Cree employment in the forest industry. The Cree rejected 
this offer as it did not address its most crucial demand: the unequivocal 
obligation of all forestry operations to submit to social and environmental 
impact assessments.
On March 15, 2001, the Supreme Court of Canada refused to hear 
the Cree’s appeal against the ruling of the Quebec Court of Appeals 
cancelling Judge Croteau’s interim judgment and upheld that decision. 
Undaunted by this reversal, the Cree took their case instead to the court 
of public opinion, hoping to embarrass the government. They essentially 
lobbied the US government to raise additional duties on Quebec softwood 
lumber on account of the fact that the Quebec government subsidized the 
forest industry by imposing duties lower than what the market dictated 
and by waiving their obligation of forest companies to submit to impact 
assessment as its own rules command. As 87 percent of Quebec’s lumber 
exports are to the United States, the government took notice. Similarly, 
the uncompromising critique of the Quebec forestry regime the Cree 
presented to the parliamentary commission examining the new Act to 
Amend the Forest Act, 2001 did also not go unnoticed.
The Cree’s persistence eventually paid off. On October 23, 2001 they 
signed the Agreement in principle that would be rati? ed a few months later 
as the Paix des Braves. In doing so, they agreed to drop their legal suit 
against the government. Analysts agree by and large that the government 
had much to lose by continuing to object to the Cree’s claims on Quebec’s 
boreal forest. The political impasse created by their legal action stalled its 
ambitions to develop further hydroelectric projects in the north, notably in 
the watershed of the powerful Rupert River. In calculating its opportunity 
costs, the government realized that it had more to gain by settling with the 
Cree over forest management issues than by questioning the legitimacy of 
their position and opposing them. Be that as it may, it does not take away 
the fact that the Cree held fast and acquired as a result substantial sway 
over the management of their land. 
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The Waswanipi Cree Model Forest
The story of the Waswanipi Cree Model Forest (WCMF) is not about a 
political action in the conventional, institutional sense of the term. The 
WCMF is about community self-empowerment and the search for an 
alternative way of treating the forest in accord with Cree principles of 
land stewardship. In this sense it constitutes an eminently political gesture 
that speaks to the Cree’s determination to reintroduce the prominence of 
their environmental ethos on the land they inhabit and reappropriate, on 
their terms, control of the goods it offers.
Waswanipi is the southernmost of the nine Cree communities 
around James Bay. It is located 800 kilometers north of Montreal in an 
area where the forest cover is still abundant enough and the trees’ size 
suf? cient to have an appealing value. Waswanipi’s land base extends over 
35,000 square kilometers and is divided into 52 ancestral family hunting 
territories. In order to provide employment and economic spin-offs for the 
community, the Waswanipi band council created two forest enterprises: 
the Waswanipi Mishtuk Corporation, a logging company, in 1983 and 
the Apit-See-Win cooperative, a tree farm, in 1986. Both enterprises 
were merged under the Mishtuk Corporation in 1999 for administrative 
expediency. 
During the ? rst years of its operation Mishtuk did not log any 
differently than the other, non-Cree forest companies, submitting as 
well to bottom line imperatives, conforming to governmental norms and 
regulations and engaging in clear-cutting practices that disrupted the 
ecosystem of large tracts of forest. By 1991, bowing to pressures from 
the community, particularly local trappers and hunters, the company 
modi? ed its harvesting methods by reducing the quantity of felled timber 
and logging much smaller parcels of land strategically dispersed on the 
territory so as to minimize the environmental footprint. 
In fact, the community became increasingly more vocal about forestry 
issues and sought greater input in forest management and planning. In 
keeping with community expectation on this score the band successfully 
applied to be included in the Canadian model forests network in 1997. 
The Canadian model forest concept took shape in the early 1990s on 
the heels of a number of national and international commitments to 
sustainable forest management and in accord with the “Forest Principles” 
document produced at the 1992 Rio de Janeiro Earth Summit. The 
Canadian model forests network de? nes a model forest as “a place where 
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the best sustainable forest management practices are developed, tested 
and shared across the country. It is an ideal laboratory for conducting 
research on sustainable forest management.” The model forest is a not-
for-pro? t organization bringing together a group of stakeholders (forest 
companies, Aboriginal communities, maple syrup producers, woodlot 
owners, parks, environmentalists, universities, government agencies, 
recreational groups, community associations, hunters, trappers) “who 
have different perspectives on the social, economic and environmental 
dynamics within their forest”, but who “have integrated their own 
interests into their common goal of developing approaches to sustainable 
forest management that do not sacri? ce one interest for another.”12
As far as the WCMF is concerned, its particular vision hinges on 
three key components: 1. “the meaningful participation of the community 
in the land management process through the sharing and adoption of 
Cree environmental knowledge, information and perspectives”; 2.“the 
adoption of sustainable forest management principles and practices on the 
territory of the Waswanipi Cree”; and 3. the design and implementation of 
“good communication mechanisms and programs to transfer technology 
and knowledge (…) among other First Nations and at the local, national 
and international levels” (Pelletier 2). Despite some glitches and the 
reluctance of some participants in the early stages (Lussier and Lévesque), 
the WCMF provides a framework in which the Cree invariably assume 
leadership in the development of forest management processes and can 
effectively sensitize other stakeholders to the importance and socio-
environmental signi? cance of their perspective on the forest. There were 
tensions among participants during the course of the judicial con? ict that 
opposed the Cree to the Quebec government between 1998 and 2000, 
but it was decided that the WCMF could be used “as a special place to 
explore improvements” (Pelletier 6).
The WCMF operates on the basis of ? nancial support from the 
Ministry of Natural Resources, Cree Human Resource Development 
and the Canadian Forest Service (at Natural Resources Canada). It is 
managed by a 26-member board of administrators with a majority of 
Cree representatives, a smaller executive comprised of 12 members from 
the board of administrators, where again, Cree representatives are in a 
majority, and a Cree-only management team of four individuals. The 
WCMF spearheads a number of projects including a pilot project (Ndoho 
Istchee) involving three traplines and several forest companies with a view 
to integrate Cree values and needs in forest planning and management, as 
well as the “Trapline Forestry Project”, which focuses on insuring the 
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frontline participation of the Cree community in the consultation and 
decision-making processes around forest management issues (Pelletier).
Observers generally agree that the WCMF has been a pro? table 
undertaking for the Cree. It represents a very important step forward that 
brings them closer to securing more de? nitely the survival and in? uence 
of their environmental ethos, and thus to a fuller control both over the 
physical destiny of their homeland and socio-economic outcomes. 
Putting Things in Perspective 
Have the James Bay Cree truly regained control over their land? For all 
its positive results and community-based nature, the WCMF stems from 
an initiative (the Canadian model forests network) and a structure that 
are exogenous to First Nations’ mindsets; it is still somewhat short of a 
genuine “Aboriginal forestry” model. Also, its future is uncertain: Natural 
Resources Canada did not renew its funding in 2007, and without the 
? nancial assistance of the state, it is unclear whether the whole experience 
can even be continued13. A full evaluation of the results of the WCMF has 
yet to be done, but analyses of similar experiments show that the actual 
in? uence of the community in forest management remains super? cial 
and it often struggles to overcome traditional imperatives of economic 
effectiveness and the salience of the industrial forest model (Reed and 
McIlveen).  Similarly, the Paix des Braves may extend the Cree’s input in 
forest management and their leadership may still be happy with the way 
it has been unfolding so far (Saganash), but after hardly more than eight 
years of implementation it is still early to ascertain beyond any doubt 
how bene? cial and transformative it really is (Dupuis). Past experiences 
of partnership and co-management with the state have a rather mixed 
track record (Rodon; Nadasdy) and skeptics may legitimately wonder 
why the latest agreement should be any different. Finally, as critics of 
self-government agreements will be quick to argue, the bottom line has 
not changed: land rights are still extinguished and the Cree still do not 
exercise full, incontrovertible control over the entirety of their ancestral 
territory. 
Despite these many caveats a tangible fact remains: the Cree 
experienced a remarkably rapid evolution from “forestry by First 
Nations” to “forestry with First Nations”, which brought an end to their 
marginalization from decision making in the boreal forest. This ability 
to re-empower themselves and reclaim genuine in? uence over the land 
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appears all the more meaningful seen in light of the general socio-political 
context in which forest policy in Quebec is shaped.
The commercial exploitation of forest resources has long been 
an important and socially signi? cant sector of the Quebec economy. 
Through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries Quebec’s southern forests 
(and progressively northern forests as well) have been a crucial source of 
raw material ? rst for the British naval industry (until the 1840s) and then 
for the American and local lumber market and, more notably, the pulp 
and paper industry. As a result, many Quebec towns and communities 
owe their origin and existence to the forest sector. Well into the twentieth 
century, social and economic life in several rural and peripheral regions 
of the province, was organized around one, (typically American or Anglo-
Canadian owned) major sawmill or pulp and paper manufacturer and a 
number of small woodlots supplying the lumber and pulpwood markets. 
Still today many areas of Quebec remain largely dependent on the forest 
industry.14
Unsurprisingly, the socio-economic stakes are high and the forest sector 
suffers through considerable socio-political stress. First, international 
competition has reduced the ability of the Quebec forest industry to provide 
as consistent and reliable a livelihood as it did in the past for a growing 
number of forest-dependent communities whose viability hangs in the 
balance as plant shutdowns have been an all too common occurrence for 
several years now. The forest industry is global in outlook. Its “personnel 
and investment visions span the globe rather than speci? c localities,” and 
as such, the welfare of local communities and environments is “likely to 
be ? ltered through global investment opportunities where the pro? tability 
and return on investment ? gure the most prominently” (Sandberg, Houde, 
and Lavoie 68). 
Secondly, as a result, the state is regularly torn between its role as 
steward and regulator of Quebec forests15 and demands from forest 
companies and forest-dependent communities for increased access to 
timber supplies and looser harvesting norms—between, in other words, 
its of? cial commitment to sustainability and conservation and its moral 
obligation to help communities maintain their livelihood on the basis of a 
fast-depleting natural resource.16 According to a joint report of the World 
Wildlife Fund (WWF-Canada) and the Canadian Parks and Wilderness 
Society (CPAWS), Quebec has been doing rather poorly at this balancing 
act. Quebec’s approach to forest management meets virtually none of 
the standards of the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC)17 for ecology and 
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environmental protection and comes dead last among the other main 
Canadian provinces involved in forestry on a large scale (Henschel and 
Tessier). 
Finally, there is practically no consensus among stakeholders as to 
what should constitute the most appropriate approach to managing 
Quebec’s forests (Houde and Sandberg). Large, integrated lumber and 
pulp and paper transnational corporations (Abitibi-Consolidated, Kruger, 
Bowater, etc) unavoidably weigh quite heavily in de? ning the orientations 
of the industry. Though they claim commitment to sustainability, they 
favour a policy paradigm focused essentially on economic development 
and limited state intervention. Given their size and the extent of their 
economic capabilities, the government can hardly afford to disregard their 
views. Private woodlot owners, forest cooperatives, labour unions and 
wildlife and recreational organizations will take umbrage at the power of 
large companies and they are more likely to emphasize the protection of 
ecosystems and biodiversity, but in the end they share with large industrial 
concerns the same policy paradigm: environmental protection is ? ne so 
long as it does not harm the economy and hamper proper responses to 
market imperatives. On the other side of the spectrum, environmental 
groups and conservationists insist on the need to preserve the quality of 
biodiversity and the concomitant necessity to limit forest exploitation. 
Conservation, they contend, goes beyond economic interests. They argue 
that the state is too quick to endorse the industry’s demands, endangering 
in the process the forest’s health as well as animal and human habitats. 
The policy in? uence of environmentalists may be limited, but in the 
wake of the 1999 release of the hugely successful and widely acclaimed 
documentary movie L’erreur boréale on the deplorable state of sizeable 
areas of Quebec forests, public support for their views has been growing 
(Sandberg, Houde, and Lavoie)—a trend which the industry is taking 
great pain to counteract with public communication strategies designed 
to boast its ecological conscience.18
The insertion of the James Bay Cree into the politics of forest 
management in Quebec must be understood against this backdrop of a 
contested, contentious and ultimately fragile forest sector. Long precluded 
from having an input into forest management issues Indigenous peoples 
in Canada have only stepped into this policy ? eld fairly recently. The 
Constitution Act, 1982 and a number of Supreme Court decisions since 
then recognizing various aspects of Aboriginal title and the duty of 
governments and developers to consult with First Nations communities19 
have given them the legitimacy they did not have to intervene as bona ? de 
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interlocutors in forest-related matters. They have done so, however, from 
perspectives and value sets that are all their own. They do not necessarily ? t 
within the simple binary that oppose supporters of economic development 
paradigms and conservationists. Though they have in many cases sought 
the latter’s support when the requisites of their cause warranted it, they 
have also been known to endorse pro-economic development views and 
projects. “Their battle is at another level,” explain forestry specialists:
They ? ght for a development independent of federal or provincial 
(outsider) administrations and mobilize for structures that would 
allow them to make decisions on wildlife and forest management 
for the territory in which they live. This takes place as they seek to 
rede? ne the relationship to the natural resource base and territory 
that is commensurate with an aboriginal way of life. (Houde and 
Sandberg 424) 
In other words, Indigenous peoples can easily appear as the “odd man 
out” in policy deliberations about forest management. Their presence 
scrambles the dynamics of exchange and the discursive and conceptual 
parameters to which non-Indigenous participants were accustomed before 
Indigenous opinion had to be included. It complicates matters in fact and 
adds to the stress of forest managers concerned to bridge the initial divide 
between conservationists and proponents of economic development, for 
it forces non-Indigenous actors to factor in dimensions they had hitherto 
never felt compelled to consider. Capitalist enterprises committed to 
the maximization of timber production under conditions of increasing 
scarcity and international competitiveness typically react to Indigenous 
voices in forest management debates with impatience, questioning what 
they see as abusive and culturally overloaded First Nations claims on the 
forest. Conservationists, on the other hand, are certainly more welcoming 
and sympathetic to Indigenous arguments, but they tend to frame their 
understanding of the forest in idealistic, almost mythical terms that 
are foreign to First Nations’ concerns and actual experience of socio-
economic marginalization (Baldwin). 
Indigenous peoples are therefore almost always facing an upward 
battle—even with those who might readily side with them—when it comes 
to argue for their right to occupy and use the land as they please. All the 
more so, in fact, when things are considered at a meta narrative level as 
it were, beyond the purview of narrow competing economic interests that 
oppose on the surface Indigenous peoples and settler society. One must 
not underestimate the ideological and ontological gulf that exists between 
their respective conceptions of the land, the differing socio-cultural 
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meanings each loads it with, nor how it may complicate dialogue and 
negotiations over access, use and ownership.
Specialized scholarship has stressed the fundamental paradigmatic 
differences that separate the Cree’s sense of the land from that which 
informs forest companies and the state. Simply put, the Cree relate 
to the land in a much more organic and holistic way than does settler 
society, guided as it is by the western utilitarian notions of individual 
property, use-value and commodity it attaches to the land. For the Cree 
the forest is a complex socio-cultural universe in which each constitutive 
element (the trees, the lakes, the rivers, the game, the ? sh, the people, 
the landscape) contributes to the sense of self and collective identity by 
which individuals de? ne themselves and give meaning to their lives. 
“Managing” the forest implies in? nitely more than issues of productive 
capacity, timber quotas and ? ber yields, but involves ? rst and foremost 
the preservation of the socio-ecological balance that is essential to the 
regeneration of Cree culture and society (Lathoud, “Paradigmes”; 
Lévesque and Montpetit). This is not to say that the Cree are impervious 
to the economic value of the forest—they have, after all, primarily derived 
their subsistence from it for most of their history—but the economics of it 
are necessarily ? ltered through its socio-cultural meaning. One can easily 
surmise how challenging it must be for them to get their views about 
forest management and planning across in a context where the hegemonic 
language of economic imperatives unquestioningly frames the terms and 
conditions of social intercourse and deliberation.
This divide between socio-cultural paradigms is further complicated 
in Quebec by the heightened politics of nationalist identity that has 
invariably undergirded the policy decisions of successive governments 
about almost everything since the days of the Quiet Revolution. Quebecers 
have put enormous stock in the development of their northern frontier. 
Control and mastery of the north have always been intimately linked 
to their historic drive for national af? rmation and formulated in public 
discourse as the undeniable proof of their exceptional ability to regain 
the ground their history of subjugation had made them lose. Imbued with 
righteous self-purpose, they never quite imagined that the territory to 
which so much of their sense of collective worth was tied could also be 
as meaningful to another national group. As political geographer Caroline 
Desbiens explains: “the tapping of James Bay’s hydroelectric potential 
since the 1970s has been synonymous with the tapping of divergent 
national imaginaries for native and non-native people in Quebec. 
Exploitation of natural resources in the region has activated different 
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narratives of political identity for each community” (“Producing” 101; 
“Nation to Nation”). These separate narratives, molded in dissimilar 
understandings of nature and of what each community can make of it 
toward national af? rmation, have unavoidably collided over time; they 
have underscored the competition the Cree and Quebecers have engaged 
in for recognition and empowerment of their respective national or group 
identity. A competition in which, as Eurodescendants, Quebecers had a 
distinct advantage: for the Cree to have dealt with and made the best of 
this formidable hurdle is a powerful con? rmation of the effectiveness of 
their political agency.
When considered within this broad context, the Cree’s trajectory of re-
empowerment is no insigni? cant feat. The fact is, as one analyst cogently 
put it, they “have managed to transform a regime of administrative 
decentralization into a much more complex regime under which they have 
far greater power to de? ne the policy priorities, programs and orientations 
of their regional and local governing bodies. Faced with demographic 
pressures and an overdependence on government transfers [they] have 
repositioned themselves to take better advantage of the natural resource 
extraction economy of the region” (Papillon, “Aboriginal Quality of 
Life” 19).
From the standpoint of social critique, any political strategy, any policy 
choice is fair game. Intellectually, there may be nothing intrinsically 
wrong in gainsaying the strategies and policy choices that First Nations 
communities decide to endorse, but any questioning should at least be 
weighed against objective outcomes. In the case of the James Bay Cree, 
the JBNQA and the process of ongoing negotiation with the state that 
ensued legitimized their existence as collective actors and formally 
established that they could no longer be summarily dismissed when 
matters directly concerning them were at stake. In fact, as the Grand 
Council of the Crees recently recognized, “… this ever-present ? ght for 
our rights has been one thing that now de? nes us as a nation. Without 
this history, we would probably not be as motivated, as knowledgeable 
or as united in our effort to see the implementation of our rights and to 
garner respect for our existence as a nation” (18).  The Cree’s continued 
opposition to the state and their activism also forced open the way to a 
proper inclusion of their practices and traditions in the state’s plans to use 
the boreal forest and in efforts at recon? guring mainstream political and 
administrative institutions. Finally, on the Cree’s own admission, their 
situation has improved and they enjoy a greater measure of empowerment 
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and control over areas and issues they deem important for their own 
collective development. 
Although total, undivided control over the full expanse of Eeyou Istchee 
will probably continue to elude them in the foreseeable future, the story 
of the Cree’s progressive re-empowerment over matters directly affecting 
their land bears out the ability of Indigenous peoples to be artisans of 
positive socio-political change for their own communities, but also—and 
in some respect, more signi? cantly—for settler society. Indeed, while 
the Paix des Braves of? cially recognizes and consolidates thirty years of 
Cree claims on the land, it implies as well that the Quebec state and settler 
society agreed both to re-evaluate the political and institutional costs of 
not recognizing them and engage in a more authentically intercultural, 
equal and democratic interface with Indigenous peoples. Only a few years 
prior to the Paix, the Quebec government was still invoking the terra 
nullius argument in court to dismiss the notion that First Nations have 
ancestral rights to the land20, and Hydro-Quebec, Quebec’s state-owned 
power company, was commissioning historical studies to show that some 
of today’s First Nations in the Saint Lawrence valley did not exist at 
the time of contact, and that, therefore, their claims to ancestral rights 
(and, by extension, their modern territorial claims) are unfounded21. The 
Cree’s political doggedness played an important part in this momentous 
conversion.
Concluding Remarks: Rethinking the Analysis of First Nations/
State Relations
The analytical route traced here to appreciate the political signi? cance of 
territorial and self-government agreements between Indigenous peoples 
and the state in Canada does not invalidate the analysis of those who 
argue that Indigenous peoples insuf? ciently gain from them. We too 
acknowledge that the liberal state is marked by strong tendencies to 
renege on, or recast the meaning of previous commitments to making 
good on First Nations claims. We concede that it will invariably work to 
contain those claims and the political transformation they entail within 
the dominant cultural, normative and socio-institutional parameters of 
settler society. We also realize that the case of the James Bay Cree is, in 
some respects, exceptional. Despite real efforts and struggles, many other 
First Nations communities in Canada remain unsuccessful at reversing 
the traditional social dynamics of power that have been detrimental to 
their development and ability to determine their future. Unlike the Cree, 
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their resource base and assets do not happen to be as coveted by settler 
society and they ? nd themselves without the requisite leverage that would 
bring the state to lighten its sway. 
Our intellectual objective, however, lies elsewhere and is motivated 
principally by a concern for a more accurate representation and appreciation 
of the political and policy choices of First Nations communities. The 
socio-political complexity of the processes of recognition and political 
emancipation that Indigenous peoples initiate is not properly portrayed 
if, in the end, whatever measure of recognition and control they achieve, 
whatever positive change they instill in their dynamics of interaction with 
the state and settler society, is written off as incomplete or unimportant 
because it does not seem to come with as signi? cant a degree of self-
determination as one might ideally expect. 
This speaks to the broader issue of the intellectual status and meaning 
one should accord to recognition and its coupling with the goal of 
self-determination when evaluating territorial and self-government 
agreements. The literature that is currently gaining authority on this 
question is running the risk of driving itself into an analytical dead end. 
It does not analyze or make sense of issues of self-government. Instead, 
it operates on the basis of a political narrative of its own—no real self-
government without unequivocal self-determination and disengagement 
from settlers’ institutions—which develops into a political ideal, a political 
agenda against which First Nations’ political mobilizations and policy 
choices are evaluated, measured and eventually deemed insuf? cient 
or trapped into white settlers’ subjectivities. Again, there is nothing 
fundamentally wrong with this approach. Only, it must be seen for what it 
is: an ideological, normative statement rather than an analytical attempt at 
making sense of the drive for socio-political recognition behind territorial 
and self-government agreements and at understanding it in and of itself, 
from the standpoint of Indigenous peoples. 
Ours is a plea to appreciate First Nations’ political and policy choices 
from the perspective of what they actually mean for the communities 
involved. The content of recognition and self-determination will vary 
according to time, place and actors. Where nothing short of full self-
determination will do for some, a more moderate, conciliatory, “work-
within-existing-institutions” approach might be suf? cient for others. 
In the end, the priorities of the communities concerned, the way they 
understand and envision their future and development has to be respected 
and should be the main focus of analysis.
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True enough, the governance structures the Cree have agreed to work 
with may be imperfect (Dupuis; Papillon, “Aboriginal Quality of Life”). 
They may also have engaged in a development process whose outcome 
is likely to entrench the requisites of capitalist globalization even further 
(Slowey, “The State”). What is at stake though, is the way in which the role 
of Indigenous peoples in the dynamics of social change and institutional 
transformation should be represented: as social actors in their own right, 
that is as political beings fully cognizant of what is the best course of action 
for them, or as mere subjects subjugated to the dictates of overpowering 
and unshakable structural and institutional imperatives imposed from 
outside? The success of the Cree in regaining, through politically adverse 
circumstances, an appreciable measure of control over the forestry and 
environmental agenda on their ancestral territory suggests that narratives 
emphasizing the structural determinants of colonialism and capitalist 
globalization, as the main factors explaining First Nations’ relations with 
the state and settler society, may need somehow to be refashioned. Not so 
much because colonialism and the possessive individualism of capitalist 
social relations are not realities Indigenous peoples have to contend 
with—they undeniably are—but because some, like the James Bay Cree, 
transcend these realities and manage to forge ahead in spite of them. That 
this is possible against often insurmountable odds is the story that needs 
to be told.
Analyses of First Nations/state relations that stress the historical 
weight and socio-economic embeddedness of the patterns of power 
and domination imposed by settlers constitute a necessary reminder of 
the societal logic that is responsible for the dif? cult living conditions 
experienced by large segments of First Nations communities in Canada 
and for the persistence of often daunting obstacles to meaningful 
social change in those communities. However, as more stories of self-
empowerment and agency emerge, it may be time to move beyond such 
analyses and recast them in ways that re? ect the political assertiveness 
of Indigenous peoples and their role in de? ning the terms of their 
contemporary interface with the state and settler society. To continue 
to frame the understanding of First Nations/state relations by focusing 
predominantly on the historical injuries done to Indigenous peoples is 
to encourage ultimately “a politics of blame directed not at empowering 
the injured or vulnerable, but at punishing the perpetrators”—a “politics 
of resentment”, as it were, “which reinforces social powerlessness by 
making that powerlessness the basis for political recognition and legal 
redress” (Armstrong 23; Brown). The course of action followed by the 
Cree over the past three decades indicates that they did not dwell much 
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on resentment. They worked instead through the existing system of power 
relations, constituting themselves as legitimate subjects in the process. 
They determined for themselves the kinds of responses needed to bring 
about the changes to this system of power they felt necessary to achieve 
their goals of socio-economic development and political af? rmation. 
Should this be considered a satisfactory outcome even though it 
fails in the end to eradicate the system of power and domination that 
has been deleterious to Indigenous peoples? In one of his last interviews, 
French philosopher Michel Foucault offers in a re? ection on the theme of 
liberation in his work a thoughtful basis to answer this question:
I have always been somewhat suspicious of the notion of 
liberation … I am not trying to say that liberation as such, or this 
or that form of liberation, does not exist: when a colonized people 
attempts to liberate itself from its colonizers, this is indeed a 
practice of liberation in the strict sense. But we know very well, 
and moreover, in this speci? c case, that this practice of liberation 
is not in itself suf? cient to de? ne the practices of freedom that will 
still be needed if this people, this society, and these individuals are 
to be able to de? ne admissible and acceptable forms of existence or 
political society. This is why I emphasize practices of freedom over 
processes of liberation; again the latter have their place, but they 
do not seem to me to be capable by themselves of de? ning all the 
practical forms of freedom. (qtd. in Armstrong 22)22
If one takes liberation to be necessarily tantamount to the releasing 
of a pre-existing social or political identity from an oppressive external 
force, the achievements of the Cree in the boreal forest of Eeyou Istchee 
can only seem half-hearted. A politics of liberation, though, as Foucault 
argues, is primarily a fairly visceral reaction to oppression, not quite 
an organized set of principles capable of informing the direction a 
community or a society should take to assume the tasks and demands 
of freedom and formulate its working logic in ways that are meaningful 
for all its members. A politics of freedom implies maturity beyond 
the immediate objective of emancipation from an unbearable system 
of power and domination. In this sense, “freedom is the careful and 
innovative deployment of a power which is exercised, Foucault suggests, 
in the effort ‘to acquire the rules of law, the management techniques, 
and also the morality, the ethos, the practices of the self, that will allow 
us to play these games of power with as little domination as possible’” 
(Armstrong 22). Critics of self-government agreements, we submit, tend 
to meld liberation from power with the attainment of freedom. They are 
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different outcomes and political objectives. The particular experience of 
the Cree with respect to institutional and sociopolitical transformation in 
the boreal forest instructs us all to ponder this crucial distinction in order 
to cast First Nations politics in its right frame.
Notes
* The authors thank their research assistants Nancy Bouchard, Julie Cunningham, Karine 
Dubé and Alexandre Morin-Chassé for their work on this project, as well as their colleagues 
of the SSHRC-funded (MCRI) research group on Indigenous Peoples and Governance for 
their comments on draft versions of this article. 
1. “Land of the (James Bay) Cree”, in Cree language.
2. Strictly speaking, the use of the notion of self-government in reference to Indigenous 
peoples is generally reserved in the Canadian context to formal self-government 
agreements between the Canadian government and First Nations communities. Although 
provinces can be and have been part of self-government negotiations, the power to grant 
Indigenous peoples self-government rests ultimately with the federal government as issues 
of Aboriginal political and administrative authority are framed by the Indian Act, a federal 
legislation. Still, within areas of jurisdiction that are constitutionally theirs, provinces 
exercise authority over First Nations communities and tensions over how much local power 
and administrative autonomy the latter should be allowed to enjoy are part and parcel of 
their relationship with provincial governments.  Therefore, in this article we use the notion 
of self-government and the term “self-government agreement” in their broad and generic 
sense and not necessarily with reference to the institutional framework put in place by the 
Canadian state to settle self-government claims emanating from First Nations communities. 
Self-government is thus understood here mainly with respect to the oppositional dynamics 
they regularly experience in their dealings with provincial governments as they seek to 
secure a larger measure of autonomy and control over their collective destinies.
3. Otherwise known under its of? cial designation as An Agreement Concerning a New 
Relationship between le Gouvernement du Québec and the Crees of Québec. The Paix 
des Braves represents the resolution of several years of political tension and negotiations 
between Quebec and the Cree nation to iron out lingering issues of implementation and 
interpretation of the provisions of the 1975 James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement. 
The new agreement formalizes the nation-to-nation relationship of the Cree with the 
Quebec government and confers on the Cree nation greater responsibility in economic and 
community development as well as direct involvement in the forest and mining industries.
4. See also Altamirano-Jimenez, Coulthard, and Nadasdy for a similar perspective.
5. See also Belanger and Newhouse.
6. This programmatic vision has been developed particularly in the work of Taiaiake Alfred 
(Peace; Wasàse).
7. The perspective of Bill Namagoose on this score is telling. Mr. Namagoose is the Executive 
Director of the Grand Council of the Crees and a long-time key activist and advocate 
of Cree political rights. He wrote the following a few years ago, as he was taking stock 
of the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement and 30 years of political interaction 
between the Cree and the Quebec government: “When our leaders met in 1975, their 
children’s education was in the hands of the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs 
or the Commission scolaire of Nouveau Quebec. Prior to that, education was delivered by 
the Roman Catholic Church [sic] and Anglican churches. Similarly, health services were 
provided for us, not by us. Education and health services were pitiful, but we had little say 
in either case. Our local governments consisted of perhaps one or two band employees and 
provided almost no services. We had no water or sewer systems, and little housing. As a 
result of our collective action through the Grand Council, we now have local governments 
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with hundreds of employees. We operate our school and health systems and have an income 
security program for those who want to live in the bush. These are examples of what we 
have accomplished over the past 30 years” (“A Message” 3). And in a more recent speech, 
he also noted: “The Crees were criticized in 1975 by many Aboriginal groups in Canada 
for having signed an agreement with Canada and with Quebec, thus in some manner they 
thought, weakening the relationship between Aboriginal peoples and the Imperial Crown. 
We were however trying to get into Canada on terms that were the best for our people. (…). 
Today … over 90 percent of our people speak the Cree language, 95 percent of our people 
still live in the Cree communities, we have the lowest rate of suicide among Aboriginal 
communities in Canada (about the same rate for Quebec), and our employment rate, while 
variable, seems to be at about 80 percent most of the time” (“Bill Namagoose”). Mr. 
Namagoose of course is a political leader who played a central role in the socio-economic 
transformation and improvement of his community; one can expect that his assessment of 
the policy choices endorsed by the Cree leadership over the years will be marked by his 
own sense of his personal investment in that process. Still, most of the key decisions made 
by Cree authorities since the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement, particularly in 
matters of economic development and environmental protection, have been submitted to 
extensive public consultations and referenda. There is no compelling reason to believe 
that they do not re? ect the will of the majority or that they have not been designed with 
genuine objectives of socio-economic betterment for the Cree nation as a whole. One must 
also remember that barely three years prior to the signature of the JBNQA, the Quebec 
government was poised to undertake the construction of the largest hydro electric complex 
in the country and ? ood in the process huge tracts of hunting and ? shing ground without 
any prior consultation with the Cree, let alone consideration for the resulting destruction 
of their livelihood and the socio-cultural system that hinged so intimately on the land. And 
just a few years earlier, in 1969, the federal government’s White Paper was suggesting 
the ? nal social assimilation and legal disappearance of Indigenous peoples in Canada. As 
the JBNQA recognized the Cree as legitimate collective socio-political actors, it basically 
reversed and put a stop to a policy trend that consisted in simply ignoring Indigenous 
peoples in development projects. Seen against the social and political backdrop of the time, 
the JBNQA, for all the imperfections that it would later show, was a major accomplishment 
for the Cree. 
8. Quoted from the Agreement’s preamble. The Agreement is available on line: http://www.
autochtones.gouv. qc.ca/relations_autochtones/ententes/cris/entente-020207_en.pdf. 
9. For more detailed information on the speci? c responsibilities and duties of the Cree-
Quebec Forestry Board and the Joint Working Groups, see chapter 3 of the Agreement, 
sections 3.15 to 3.47.
10. Such as low stumpage fees, ? nancial assistance for the construction of logging roads, large 
land grants to forest companies and allowing mills to increase their productive capacity.
11. See supra, note 7 and Papillon (“Aboriginal Quality of Life”).
12. From the website of the Canadian model forests network (http://www.modelforest.net/
cmfn/en/about/whatis.aspx), see under the link “What is a model forest?”
13. Minutes of the 150th meeting of the James Bay Advisory Committee on the Environment, 
September 12, 2007, p. 10. Available on line at http://www.ccebj-jbace.ca/english/
organization/documents/Minutes-150_001.pdf.
14. The forest industry is implanted in more than 600 Quebec municipalities and is the main 
source of economic activity in 250 of them. Forest products rank ? rst among Quebec’s 
exports with a value of more than 20 billion dollars annually. The industry provides 
over 100,000 jobs, one ? fth of which in harvesting activities. Forest-based tourism and 
recreation also generate over 1,5 billion dollars worth of business every year (Stein and 
Lavoie 2).
15. Ninety-two percent of Quebec’s forest is public land, owned and managed by the Quebec 
government (Stein and Lavoie 2).
16. Regular epidemics of spruce budworms, the low regeneration rate of harvested areas 
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(only 45 percent re-grow properly), inadequate reforestation measures, and insuf? cient 
enforcement of regulatory norms of harvesting account in large part for the depletion of 
Quebec forest (Stein and Lavoie 2).
17. The Forest Stewardship Council is an international certi? cation and labeling system 
guaranteeing that forest products brought to markets come from responsibly managed 
forests and veri? ed recycled sources. FSC certi? cation ensures that forest products bearing 
the “check-tree” logo meet but the strictest environmental and social standards.
18. See for example the document of the Quebec Forest Industry Council, titled Le 
renouvellement de la forêt québécoise: questions et réponses (http://www.cifq.qc.ca/
imports/_uploaded/CIFQ_BroCFM2003.pdf), or the websites of companies such as 
Abitibi-Consolidated or Kruger.
19. Among some of the most relevant and in? uential decisions ? gure Sparrow (1990), 
Gladstone (1996),  Nikal (1996), Delgamuukw (1997), Haida Nation (2004) and Taku 
River First Nation (2004).
20. The terra nullius argument holds that since hardly anyone lived on the North American 
continent in any socially organized fashion at the time of contact, the idea that Indigenous 
peoples today have rights stemming from their pre-contact occupation of the land makes no 
sense. The argument was used by the government before the Supreme Court in R. v. Côté 
in 1996, but deemed inapplicable.
21. See Savard. These research ? ndings are available in Dawson (Des Attikamègues; Feu, 
fourrures).
22. We thank Michael Asch for bringing our attention to the analytical signi? cance of this 
passage. 
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